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Abstract 
 
Devolution has been described as a key ‘global trend’ over recent decades as governments 
have decentralised power and responsibilities to subordinate regional institutions (Rodriguez-
Pose and Gill, 2003). UK devolution is characterised by its asymmetrical nature with different 
territories granted different institutional arrangements and powers. In this paper, we seek 
examine the role of state personnel in mobilising the new institutional machinery and 
managing the process of devolution, focusing on transport policy. Our research shows a clear 
contrast between London and Northern Ireland, on the one hand, and Scotland and Wales, on 
the other, in terms of the effectiveness of political leaders in creating clear policy priorities 
and momentum in transport. 
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Introduction 
 
Devolution, or political decentralisation, has been described as a key ‘global trend’ over 
recent decades (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003), involving a “transfer of power downwards to 
political authorities at immediate or local levels” by the central state” (Agranoff, 2004, p.26). 
It can be seen as one of the most important processes of state restructuring, representing one 
way in which established nation-states have sought to adapt to conflicting pressures such as 
globalisation, the rise of supra-national institutions and sub-state nationalism (Jessop, 2002; 
Peck, 2001). This on-going process of adaptation now tends to be understood in terms of the 
qualitative adjustment of state forms, involving elements of both deregulation and re-
regulation and decentralisation and centralisation, rather than resulting in a simple 
quantitative diminution or erosion of state powers (Brenner, 2004; Peck, 2001).  Here, a focus 
on devolution (Brenner, 2004) is particularly useful in conveying a broader sense of the state 
“as a (political) process in motion” in place of the conventional view of it as “some lumbering 
bureaucratic monolith” (Peck, 2001, p.449). 
 
Many Western European states have devolved power to the regional scale since the 1970s 
(Keating, 1998). The UK resisted this devolutionary trend until the late 1990s when the 
Labour government introduced a programme of devolution (Hazell, 2000). UK devolution is 
characterised by its asymmetrical nature with different territories granted different 
institutional arrangements and powers, in contrast to symmetrical forms of devolution in 
which all regions have the same powers (Keating, 1998). Thus, Scotland has an elected 
parliament that has primary legislative competence over most ‘domestic’ policy issues; 
Northern Ireland has an elected, power-sharing assembly with wide-ranging legislative 
competence; and Wales has an elected assembly without primary legislative responsibilities – 
these are currently reserved to Westminster – although certain additional powers were granted 
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in 2006 and it is planned to hold a referendum on moving to full legislative powers by 2011. 
London, stripped of city-wide government by the abolition of the Greater London Council 
(GLC) in the 1980s, now has an elected mayor and assembly with powers that are restricted to 
certain key areas such as transport, planning and policing.1 In the remainder of England, only 
limited administrative reform took place, largely through the creation of Regional 
Development Agencies (although these are now being abolished by the new Coalition 
Government that took office in the UK in May 2010).  
 
In this paper, we seek to extend the agenda of Jones et al (2004), both theoretically and 
empirically, by examining the role of state personnel in mobilising the new institutional 
machinery put in place by Westminister and managing the process of devolution. The term  
state personnel refers to ministers, civil servants and policy advisors as well as representatives 
of state agencies which operate outside of the civil service, emphasising the nature of the state 
as a ‘peopled organisation’ (Peck, 2001). Our analysis is informed by Jessop’s strategic-
relational approach which holds that the power of the state is the power of the social forces 
acting in and through it (Jessop, 1990: 269-270). This highlights the relationships between 
structure and agency, particularly in terms of the differential effects of state structures on 
agents (Jessop, 2001).  
 
The paper focuses on the policy sphere of transport. Just as in many policy areas, devolution 
grants the devolved administrations the institutional capacity to develop their own policies. 
But transport is an especially interesting case due to the complexity of the division of powers 
between central government and the devolved administrations (MacKinnon et al, 2008; 
Smyth, 2003). Unlike other policy areas which were either devolved or reserved to 
Westminster by the devolution legislation, transport powers were divided between the two 
levels of government. Added to this is the asymmetrical distribution of transport powers 
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between the different devolved administrations (see Table 1, below). The research upon 
which this paper is based was conducted between December 2004 and March 2006. It 
involved the collation and analysis of policy documents and 32 semi-structured interviews 
with 36 respondents across the four devolved territories of Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland 
and London, including state personnel, policy advisors and representatives of key interest 
groups and transport operators.  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds in four main parts. First, we examine the literature on 
state restructuring and devolution, drawing attention to the role of state personnel and 
institutional practices. Next, we outline the institutional structures established under 
devolution in the transport field across the different territories. This is followed by a 
consideration of the operationalisation of these structures, particularly in terms of the role of 
ministers and civil servants in facilitating the development of policy agendas. Fourth, we 
assess the evolving relations between the devolved administrations and the UK government, 
outlining how state personnel at both levels have responded to and shaped the new 
institutional landscape. A brief conclusion summarises our arguments and considers their 
wider theoretical implications.  
 
State restructuring and devolution  
 
Jessop’s neo-Marxist strategic-relational approach combines two crucial concepts (Jessop, 
1990; 2001). First, strategy is used to mediate between structure and agency. In contrast to 
Offe’s notion of structural selectivity, Jessop (1990) defines the state as a system of strategic 
selectivity. Whilst state structures contain in-built biases that make them more accessible to 
some social groups than others, a particular group’s prospects of gaining access to the 
resources and capabilities of the state will be shaped by the strategy that they adopt towards it. 
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Second, Jessop follows Poulantzas (1978) in conceiving of the state as a social relation that 
derives its specificity from the interplay between state structures and the efforts of social 
forces to promote their interests in particular contexts (Jessop, 1990). The state, as such, has 
“no power; it is merely an institutional ensemble; it has only a set of institutional capacities 
and liabilities which mediate that power; the power of the state is the power of the social 
forces acting in and through the state” (Jessop, 1990, p. 269-70).  
 
According to the strategic-relational approach, the state has no essential unity, but must be 
actively unified through specific ‘state projects’ which mobilise the various apparatuses of the 
state behind a distinct line of action (Jessop, 1990). Jessop’s conception of the state as a 
loosely articulated institutional ensemble which must be actively unified through particular 
state projects focuses attention on the role of state personnel. In this sense, the state is a 
“peopled organisation, rather than being an insulated domain of anonymous policy-makers 
and authorless policy conventions” (Jones, et al., 2004, p.91; Peck, 2001).  A focus on state 
personnel, however, raises the question of how to conceptualise structure and agency. 
Giddens’s structuration theory is an obvious point of reference here, regarding structure and 
agency as mutually constitutive rather than exclusive, with structures defined as sets of rules 
and resources which facilitate the production and reproduction of social action (Giddens, 
1984). Ultimately, however, Jessop (2001) is critical of this formulation for both conflating 
structure and agency and assuming that a particular structure is equally constraining or 
enabling for all actors (cf. Archer, 1995). By contrast, the strategic-relational approach 
examines structure in relation to action and action in relation to structure, emphasising the 
differential capacities of actors. From this perspective, then:  
Structures are thereby treated analytically as strategic in their form, content and 
operation; and actions treated analytically as structured, more or less context sensitive, 
and structuring. Applying this approach involves examining how a given structure may 
privilege some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal 
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horizons, some actions over others; and the ways, if any, in which actors (individual 
and/or collective) take account of the differential privileging through ‘strategic-context 
analysis’ when choosing a course of action (Jessop, 2001, p.1223).  
Whilst Jessop’s arguments are highly abstract in tone, he stresses the contingent nature of 
state strategies, requiring concrete research to examine the interaction of structure and agency 
in particular temporal and spatial contexts.  
 
Neil Brenner (2004) explicitly spatialises Jessop’s strategic-relational approach in his 
conception of ‘new state spaces’ (Brenner, 2004, p.90-4). Two aspects of this are of particular 
interest here. First, ‘state spatial projects’ refers to the internal operations of the state, 
mobilising state personnel and agencies behind a particular line of action. This process is 
often shaped by the tensions between centralising and decentralising tendencies. Second, 
Brenner emphasises the path dependent nature of state restructuring.2 Drawing upon Jamie 
Peck’s (1998) account of institutional ‘layering’, this  focuses attention on the interaction 
between state projects such as devolution and pre-existing institutional arrangements, creating 
new ‘geographies of governance’:  
The process by which new geographies of governance is formed is not a pseudo-
geological one in which a new layer (or round of regulation) supersedes the old, to 
form a new institutional surface. Rather, it is a dynamic process in which (national) 
regulatory tendencies and local institutional outcomes mould one another in a 
dialectical fashion. Geographies of governance are made at the point of interaction 
between the unfolding layer of regulatory processes / apparatuses and the inherited 
institutional landscape (Peck, 1998, p.29).  
This formulation highlights the relationship between inherited and projected spaces of 
governance with the former representing the institutional legacies of previous rounds of state 
restructuring whereas the latter carry the political and ideological imprint of the latest ‘state 
spatial project’ (Brenner, 2004). While Peck and Brenner are largely concerned with local and 
regional spaces, the key underlying point about the ‘new state spaces’ approach concerns its 
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sensitivity to the prior institutional occupation of state space and emphasis on the path-
dependent nature of restructuring processes. In principle, it is scale-neutral, being equally 
applicable to the national, regional or local levels.  
 
The notion of ‘filling in’ has been developed by a team of British political geographers to 
account for processes of institutional change occurring at the regional scale in the context of 
devolution (Goodwin et al., 2005; Jones et al., 2005). Filling in is a response to the limitations 
of the established concept of ‘hollowing out’ which conveys a sense of state restructuring as a 
unidirectional transfer of power away from national states (see Jessop, 1997). Shaw and 
MacKinnon (in press: 3) redefine filling in to refer to “any concrete form of institutional 
reconfiguration that enhances the capacities of, or the functions exercised by, state and quasi-
state agencies”. They distinguish between structural and relational forms of ‘filling in’ 
whereby the former refers to the establishment of new organisational forms and the 
restructuring of existing ones. The latter, by contrast, is concerned with how such 
organisations enact and utilise their power and their development of working cultures and 
relations with other institutions and actors (ibid). This distinction is consistent with the 
strategic-relational approach by maintaining a clear conceptual separation between structure 
and agency, aiming to examine the interaction between them empirically.  
 
The recognition of a relational dimension helps to enrich the notion of filling in, emphasising 
that it should not be viewed as entailing a simple structural transfer of power from the central 
state to the devolved regions. Instead, the intricacies of filling in will vary between the 
devolved regions, according to a range of contextual factors and circumstances, including the 
nature and extent of devolved powers, political leadership and ideology, electoral pressures 
and relations with interest groups. The central UK government remains a very powerful actor 
within a state that is both asymmetrically devolved and still centralized in many respects. This 
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focuses attention on the ‘vertical’ relationships between the devolved administrations and the 
central state as two distinct but inter-linked scales of government (Brenner, 2001). Recent 
geographical work on scalar practices and politics (MacKinnon, 2010; Moore, 2008) provide 
conceptual insights into the development of such ‘vertical’ relations.  
 
In the context of UK devolution, Jones et al (2004) view the relationship between state 
personnel and institutions as recursive in nature (Jessop, 2001; ibid). Particular agents are 
both shaped by processes of institutional change initiated by other branches and scales of the 
state and shape such changes through the development of day-to-day working practices, 
cultures and relations. Indeed, in this sense, to adopt the terminology of Duncan and Goodwin 
(1988), state personnel can be seen as both agents and objects of the broader process of state 
restructuring, representing part of what is actually identified as ripe for reform, alongside 
associated structures and practices, whilst at the same time being required to actually deliver 
new initiatives and organisational forms. As such, devolution has not only created new 
organisational forms, strategies and relations which have changed the role of state personnel; 
it has also been ultimately interpreted and delivered through the actions of such personnel in 
populating and mobilising the new structures, and in managing the project of devolution 
within particular spaces of governance (Jones et al., 2004). The role of state personnel in this 
respect will be influenced by the inherited routines and norms of civil service culture which 
have been characterised by a prevailing instrumentalism in the UK (Mitchell, 2004). This 
raises the question of the extent to which state personnel sought to adapt the ‘state project’ of 
devolution to these inherited routines and norms, fostering path dependence (Pierson, 1993).   
 
 
Establishing the new transport structures 
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In this section, we examine processes of structural filling in under devolution (Goodwin et al., 
2005). Given that devolution was effectively grafted on existing institutions (Jeffery, 2007), 
there is a need to relate the establishment of new administrative and political structures to pre-
devolution arrangements. While discrete transport sections, or units, were found within the 
different regional administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland prior to legislative 
devolution, their role was rather limited, as the Welsh case indicates:  
…transport policy… used to exist as a stand alone division prior to devolution. A very 
small division because it very largely, to use that wonderful term, Welshified 
everything that came out of whatever was the English Department... Whichever 
department it was in Westminster that was responsible for transport, we had a small 
transport policy division which basically took those forward. A lot of times actually 
doing no more than arranging for the Welsh translation of whatever policy document or 
implementation process was coming through, it really didn’t do a great deal more, 
administered some grants, there were some grant regimes (Transport official, Wales).   
In this sense, the role of the transport units was essentially one of adapting UK-wide policy to 
local conditions, securing ‘parity with particularity’ (Carmichael and Knox, 2004).  
 
As already noted, the division of transport powers between Westminster and the devolved 
administrations is complex and asymmetrical. Northern Ireland and Scotland enjoy the 
greatest powers, followed by London and then Wales (Table 1). The main transport policy 
responsibilities of the devolved administrations are road infrastructure and predominantly 
local issues such as bus policy and concessionary fares, broadly corresponding to the areas 
administered by the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Offices before devolution. Those 
functions retained at UK level are generally regulatory in nature – safety, economic 
regulation, vehicle and driver licensing and so on – and those governed by international 
treaty, especially aviation and shipping. Arrangements for national railways (the former 
British Rail) were probably the most complex, with the strategic direction and regulation of 
the industry reserved to Westminster, although in recent developments Scotland has assumed 
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more-or-less complete control over its railways and both London and Wales have taken on 
further responsibility.3   
 
Table 1 here 
 
Following devolution, important changes to the institutional architecture of transport policy 
were made in all four of the devolved jurisdictions through processes of structural filling in 
(Goodwin et al., 2005). These new structures of governance emerged out of the interaction 
between devolution as a national state project and pre-existing institutional arrangements 
(Peck, 1998). The initial organisation of the Scottish Executive saw transport bracketed along 
with planning and environment in one department from May 1999 until November 2001. 
Transport was then added to the responsibilities of the Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong 
Learning in November 2001, followed by the incorporation of transport into the Enterprise, 
Transport and Lifelong Learning Department (ETLLD) in May 2003 (Table 2). Transport 
was, however, the subject of a separate ministerial portfolio from 2003-2007, whilst 
previously it was the responsibility of the Deputy Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong 
learning. After forming a minority government in May 2007, the SNP restructured the 
Scottish Executive by reducing the number of senior ministers from 11 to 6 ‘Cabinet 
Secretaries’, and Transport became part of the expanded Finance and Sustainable Growth 
portfolio with a dedicated junior minister responsible for Transport, Infrastructure and 
Climate Change.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
The filling in of transport structures has been broadly similar in Wales, with some specific 
differences. After being initially integrated as part of the environment function with local 
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government, transport remained with environment and planning when this was split from 
local government in February 2000 (Table 3). Again, departments and ministerial portfolios 
were reorganised following the May 2003 elections as transport was merged with economic 
development into one department under one minister, reflecting lobbying from business 
organisations and the “strategic view of the First Minister” (Assembly member, Wales).  
 
Table 3 here 
 
Devolution created a complex structure of governance in Northern Ireland, comprised of an 
expanded and reorganised executive, flanked by the newly-established assembly. The 
devolved institutions inherited responsibility over a plethora of quangos in the form of public 
boards and authorities at the intermediate level – largely established under direct rule, often to 
depoliticise service delivery in a context of sectarian strife and violence – and a relatively 
powerless tier of local authorities (Knox and Carmichael, 2006). Unlike Scotland and Wales, 
the structure of the central executive under devolution was a direct product of the power-
sharing agreement between unionists and nationalists, dictating – in order to ensure 
proportional representation of the two communities in government – that the previous 
arrangement of six departments was replaced by a new one of eleven departments (Table 4). 
Within the new structure, transport is part of the Department of Regional Development 
(DRD), consisting essentially of infrastructure functions and regional planning. After the 
restoration of devolution in May 2007, Sinn Fein gained regional development under the 
d’Hondt formula used for allocating ministerial portfolios. In a similar fashion to the 
Government of Wales Act 1998, the 1998 Agreement required the establishment of an 
Assembly Committee for each of the main departments of the Northern Ireland Executive. 
 
Table 4 here 
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The lack of pre-existing regional structures in London gave the Labour Government greater 
scope to design a new form of devolution which directly embodied the ‘state spatial project’ 
of devolution (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). This resulted in the creation of a new 
‘strategic’ authority, charged with responsibilities for transport and economic development 
(Sweeting, 2003). In practice, however, the introduction of this executive model of devolution 
meant that the background and personality of Ken Livingstone was central to the 
establishment and activation of the new structures (Sweeting 2002, 2003).4 This created early 
difficulties given the Labour government’s opposition to his candidacy:  
I mean one of the interesting things I think is because of the particular dynamics of Ken 
coming in as an independent, there was a legacy of some suspicion and… concern in 
his mind that he was being left with an organisation that had been set up by people 
fundamentally opposed to him… It might not be his best tool… And it took some time 
I think to work through that, significant changes in personnel etc. But I think you know 
within a couple of years we had cleared that hurdle largely (GLA official, London). 
Thus, the first couple of years saw considerable changes in structures and staff within the 
Greater London Authority (GLA) as the Mayor placed his stamp on the organisation. As well 
as Bob Kiley, the former Chief Executive of the New York City Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority, who became London’s first Transport Commissioner, the Mayor appointed a 
“highly motivated” and highly-paid senior management team within Transport for London 
(TfL) (TfL official, London). This, along with the leadership provided by the Mayor and the 
attractions of working in London as a world city (Sweeting, 2002), helped to create a dynamic 
and entrepreneurial organisational culture (see Jones et al., 2005).  
 
The changing role of state personnel 
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The capacity and expertise of state personnel – in the context of our discussion, relational 
filling in – is obviously a key factor determining the stability and success of devolution in the 
different jurisdictions. Many non-state actors – representatives of business organisations, 
transport operating companies, consultants – were fairly critical of civil servants’ ability to 
develop policy, particularly in terms of ‘championing’ and  delivering strategically important 
projects with one respondent (a transport operator in Northern Ireland) describing them as 
“process controllers” (i.e. good at overseeing administrative matters but ill-suited to policy 
innovation). Northern Ireland and Wales were characterised by a considerable continuity of 
key civil servants in transport, allowing expertise and relationships with external actors to be 
maintained, unlike Scotland where there was considerable turnover of personnel. According 
to one local government representative, the increased administrative burden of formulating 
and implementing transport policy under devolution has not been matched by any increase in 
staff numbers or expertise within the devolved administrations, a problem compounded by the 
civil service practice of staff rotation (authors’ interviews). The ‘churn’ of state personnel 
with the Scottish Executive created some uncertainty, particularly in a devolved structure 
predicated on notions of change (Jones et al., 2004). As another respondent commented, 
referring to what he saw as a tendency to launch a succession of ill-considered initiatives and 
reforms:  
So you do actually wonder what is actually gained by moving the… changing the 
superstructure because organisation of capabilities is a very fragile thing and a part of 
organisational capability comes actually from doing the job for a while and actually 
understanding your patch and building up accumulated knowledge of the way things 
work. If you start undermining that process for whatever reason, I think you have got to 
demonstrate the changes better than what is there at the moment. At the moment we 
don’t think what is on offer is actually better and more effective than what is there at 
present (Local government official, Scotland).  
While this respondent – referring particularly to proposals to establish Regional Transport 
Partnerships and the delivery agency Transport Scotland (MacKinnon and Shaw, in press) – 
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conceded that the Executive might be a marginal improvement on the old Scottish Office, the 
reduction in contact with Whitehall under devolution was held to have impeded the sharing of 
‘good practice’ and choice of policy directions. In Northern Ireland, by contrast, stronger 
relations with the Department for Transport (DfT) in London seemed to have been 
maintained, despite the institutional separateness of the civil service there.  
 
One key factor shaping the success of transport devolution is the role of individual ministers 
in terms of gaining additional resources and priority for transport and injecting dynamism and 
direction into the policy process. Such political leadership can be seen as particularly 
important in the context of devolution given the magnitude of change and the challenges of 
negotiating and operating the new institutional machinery for state and non-state actors alike 
(Rhodes et al., 2003; Sweeting, 2002). In response to a question on whether devolution has 
changed the dynamic between ministers and civil servants, one respondent remarked:  
I think by and large the opposite problem was mainly the case where the new ministers 
were being taken in and being educated by the ‘Sir Humphreys’5 of each department. 
And you know the new boss is the same as the old boss as The Who once sang. So… 
there was a tremendous variation in that, depending on… well, almost the personality 
and the determination of each minister to make their mark you know. Some ministers 
will come in, the civil servants will say there is a list of 50 important things, and if you 
are like me you say, tell me the 5 most important ones. Of course the civil servants will 
say, oh they are all equally important you know… So the trick is in being a minister is 
to say, well I am telling you I am picking 3 or 4 things, and this is what we are going 
for hell for leather! (Local government official, Scotland).  
Elsewhere two politicians emerged as key players of transport devolution in terms raising the 
profile of transport and developing radical policy measures. The first is perhaps obvious, the 
London Mayor, Ken Livingstone, who prioritised transport, appointed a high profile 
Transport Commissioner and introduced the UK’s first congestion charge in the face of media 
opposition and government scepticism. This reflects not only the importance of transport to 
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the City and the nature of the powers available to the Mayor, but is also the result of the 
political strategy adopted by Livingstone in exercising his powers: 
But a rather stark difference to what there was before from London, this clearly was an 
open door, with clearly legislated responsibility. So what did the mayor do?  I think this 
picks up one thing which you will probably hear a lot in conversation… that part of 
how things will develop will depend on the initiative and the assertiveness of local 
government today, in terms of asking for things and saying what they will do with 
them… Maybe it was just a quirk of history, a quirk of personalities, but… some key 
issues which… led Mr Livingstone to really embrace the accountability of saying he 
wanted to do certain things, he wanted to be judged on the successes. He was more than 
willing to take responsibility if they failed (TfL official, London).   
Partly as a result of this strategic political leadership (Leach and Wilson, 2004), TfL has 
delivered several major projects on time and on budget, building a reputation for competence 
and innovation.  
 
The second key political figure of transport devolution is more surprising, Peter Robinson, 
Minister for Regional Development in Northern Ireland from 1999-2000 and 2001-2002 who 
was instrumental in the development of the Regional Transportation Strategy there, securing 
wider political and media support for its main provisions. According to one prominent 
transport expert we interviewed: 
People always moan about politicians, transport professionals think it would be a much 
better world without politicians. Transport professions, leave it to us, bloody 
politicians, we are better off without them. But my experience in Northern Ireland was 
that it was that period when you had a very…the most powerful…apart from 
Livingstone, Ken Livingstone, the most powerful transport minister that I have come 
across… [Peter] Robinson.  I mean I thought the guy was an absolute nutter… one of 
Paisley’s guys. And I was writing him off… a very astute, intelligent politician who ran 
that department and he got quite a sum of money for transport in Northern Ireland … 
You see here is the thing; devolution in itself isn’t the key issue. Devolution… opens 
the door but you have got to get somebody to walk through that door. So it was a 
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powerful politician who argued the case for transport with political colleagues. And 
they got a sum of money for railways which I was pleased about because my heart is in 
it...  But if you want a politician who played the media really well, civil servants would 
never have done that.   
The respondent’s use of the metaphor of devolution as ‘an open door’ is worthy of comment. 
In both London and Northern Ireland, the devolved structures provide a basis for an integrated 
transport policy in terms of the powers available to ministers and the existence of integrated 
delivery mechanisms in the form of TfL and Translink.6 But of course the outcomes of 
transport devolution are not just structurally determined; they also depend on how powers are 
exercised and implemented by state personnel. This echoes Jessop’s argument that the state 
has no power as such, only the power of the social forces acting in and through it (Jessop, 
1990). Even within distinctive state spaces like London and Northern Ireland, the diverse 
agencies and interests associated with the state have no essential unity. As such, the 
development of new transport strategies and initiatives such as the RTS can be seen as a key 
element of the ‘state spatial project’ of devolution, generating a degree of inter-party 
consensus and unity in Northern Ireland, prior to the suspension of devolution in 2002. Whilst 
the introduction of the congestion charge in London was more controversial, the perceived 
success of the Mayor’s transport policy has been important in narrating and legitimising the 
wider project of devolution there. By contrast, in Scotland particularly and, to a lesser extent, 
Wales, state personnel were less effective in utilising and activating the transport structures 
outlined in the previous section, reflecting a lack of strategic political leadership and the high 
turnover of officials.  
 
Institutional relations between the devolved territories and central government  
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Prior to the introduction of representative devolution in 1999, relations between the regional 
administrations and Whitehall were generally stable if often competitive as the former lobbied 
for additional resources (Mitchell, 2003). Stability was ensured by the integration of the 
regional departments into the institutional machinery of the state. Central awareness of 
regional conditions was limited prior to devolution, reflecting the common adherence to an 
overall policy and the taken-for granted assumption among civil servants and politicians that 
London was the locus of power and authority within the UK. This can be seen as an 
expression of the basic power-geometry of the UK as a centralised state (Amin et al., 2003):  
So what you have is if anything… if anything in Northern Ireland there were even 
more… subservient is the wrong word. I am looking for a different word here, but the 
civil servants were even keener to make sure that they were singing from the same 
hymn sheet. Sometimes it’s a lack of confidence actually. If you have been used to 
being dominated by the centre, it takes time to gain confidence. When I first went to 
work in Whitehall in 1998 on the White Paper, what amazed me was when they started 
to talk about we had better make sure that the territories support this… the territories? 
It was like India you know. That’s us, that’s me, I am Scottish. It’s Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, it’s territorial areas. Territorial was a civil service term. (Transport 
policy advisor).   
Wales and Northern Ireland tended to be particularly subservient, meaning at least initially 
that devolution represented a huge challenge for politicians and civil servants there.  
 
In the early years of devolution, the Whitehall assumption that the devolved administrations 
were now separate from the machinery of central government was coupled with a clear 
reluctance to contemplate giving any more power away. Thus, in the pre-devolution 
negotiations between Whitehall and the Scottish Executive over rail powers, officials were 
highly cautious, emphasising the problems that would ensue from the devolution of such 
powers, particularly in terms of cross-border services (DfT official, London). At the same 
time, the perceived need for state personnel to adopt established practices to the realities of 
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devolution prompted the establishment of a number of procedures and mechanisms for co-
ordinating institutional relations (House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 
2003), representing a form of ‘vertical’ filling in in both the structural and relational senses 
(Shaw and MacKinnon, in press).   
 
Relations between the devolved administrations and Whitehall are governed by an overall 
Memorandum of Understanding, originally agreed and signed in 1999, and a series of 
concordats between individual Departments (see DfT, undated). The concordats between the 
DfT and the different devolved administrations were described by one respondent as 
containing “motherhood and apple pie” sentiments about working together (DfT official, 
London), although the need to avoid any direct reference to the concordats for fear of raising 
the stakes in any dispute has become a key convention (Parry and MacDougal, 2005). Beyond 
the concordats, the Regional and Local Transport Delivery (RLTD) section in the DfT is 
responsible for formal liaison with the devolved territories, reflecting the ambiguities of 
asymmetrical devolution (Trench, 2004).  
 
A key mechanism for maintaining relations between the DFT and the Scottish Executive is 
the ‘High Level Forum’ (HLF). This was established in October 2002, involving senior civil 
servants involved in transport. Bilateral meetings take place every six months, focusing on 
strategic and cross-cutting issues rather than detailed operational matters (DfT official, 
London). The HLF plays an important role as the mechanism for alerting officials to existing 
or upcoming items which need collaboration or working through. It is supplemented by 
regular contact at different levels throughout the civil service on specific issues which do not 
need to be raised at the HLF, or which arise in working through issues discussed at the HLF. 
The operation of the HLF and associated routine contacts reflects the role of state personnel in 
overseeing and managing the state project of devolution, ensuring that there are effective 
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coordinating mechanisms between officials in London and Edinburgh (Horgan, 2004). The 
reliance on largely informal links and ‘middle-ground’ linkages between organisations (Jones, 
et al., 2004: 101-102) is typical of inter-governmental relations in the UK under devolution. 
By contrast, more formal mechanisms such as the concordats and Joint Ministerial 
Committees have rarely been utilised (House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 
2003; Trench, 2004). This reflects a greater reliance on relational than structural forms of 
filling in with regard to the ‘vertical’ relations between the devolved administrations and the 
central state. These distinct scales of government are linked through on-going contacts and 
networks, relating to how scalar relations have been shaped by the practices and 
understandings of state personnel (Mansfield, 2005; Moore, 2008), resulting in occasional 
conflict and confusion coupled with ongoing cooperation.  
 
A key informal rule structuring relations between Whitehall and the devolved administrations 
is that of ‘no surprises’ (Parry and MacDougal, 2005).7 The importance of this principle was 
emphasised by our respondents from the DfT, who stressed the need for active 
communication and consultation so as to maintain institutional and political relations 
(authors’ interviews). When devolution was in its early stages, a relatively large number of 
formal meetings between officials was held as state personnel sought to align existing 
procedures to the new realities of devolution, but these have become less necessary as the 
system has ‘bedded down’ (authors’ interviews). In general, despite its complexity and 
asymmetry, DfT officials regarded the devolution settlement as clear in relation to transport 
with the exception of some ‘jagged edges’ creating minor anomalies. A good example is the 
impact of the smoking ban in Scotland – where it was first introduced in the UK in March 
2006 before being adopted in Wales and Northern Ireland in April 2007 and in England in 
July 2007 – on GNER services which permitted smoking in designated carriages, raising the 
question of what would have happened when the train crossed the border into Scotland. This 
19 
 
 
anomaly was resolved in a straightforward manner when GNER simply banned smoking on 
its trains. The broader point here is the shifting nature of devolution as an unfolding process, 
or “moving object” in the words of one of our respondents, with the RLTD section receiving 
updates about “this or that piece of legislation or development” on a daily basis, requiring 
constant awareness and interaction with other parts of the DfT (DfT official, London).   
 
Relations between DfT and the GLA were particularly complex and strained, reflecting the 
conflict over the Public-Private Partnership mechanism for financing the modernisation of the 
Underground and the political hostility between the Mayor and the government (Sweeting, 
2002). As one respondent reflected:  
I mean it was a fractious relationship, zero trust between Ken and the government and 
between TfL and the Department for Transport. I’ll give you an example… five years 
ago Ken wanted me to be director of integration at TfL and uh… I was wanting to do 
that and keep my [existing post in Whitehall], it was only a day a week. But … 
Whitehall clamped down on it, and…said you can’t do it. You have got to choose, if 
you do TfL you have got to come off [the Whitehall body] which I wasn’t prepared to 
do. What that showed was there was a complete lack of trust between the two 
organisations, it was like… it was an ultimatum, you either work for us or you work for 
Ken, you can’t do both (Transport policy advisor, London).  
The disagreements over the London Underground PPP were effectively ended by court 
rulings in the government’s favour, and relations began to improve after an agreement 
between the Mayor and government in February 2003 which led to the transfer of powers 
over the Underground to the latter (Sandford, 2004).  
 
Following a review of the railway industry across Britain, The Railways Act 2005 transferred 
additional powers to the devolved administrations, in addition to abolishing the Strategic Rail 
Authority and making the government directly responsible for the strategic direction and 
performance of the industry. The Scottish Executive was granted full powers over the Scotrail 
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franchise, making it the sole signatory, together with powers to specify and fund rail 
infrastructure improvements in Scotland for Network Rail to deliver (HM Government, 
2005). Wales was given powers broadly equivalent to those held by Scotland prior to the 
implementation of this Act. The transfer of these additional powers were described as the 
largest single act of devolution since the original 1998 settlement (Scottish Government, 
2005), reflecting a greater acceptance of the role of the devolved administrations in 
Westminster. Crucially, however, this substantial transfer of powers can only be explained by 
the coming together of the devolution issue with the government’s wider agenda for 
restructuring the railways, rather than simply in terms of the persuasiveness of demands from 
the devolved jurisdictions.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has outlined the evolution of the new institutional structures in the devolved 
territories and assessed how state personnel and interest groups have responded to devolution. 
As a ‘state spatial project’ involving the establishment of new institutional structures and 
relations at the regional scale, devolution provides broader insights into the nature of the state 
as “a (political) process in motion” (Peck, 2001, p.449). The process of filling in can be seen 
as having both structural and relational dimensions (Shaw and MacKinnon, in press), with the 
former referring to the expansion and reorganisation of transport departments, the 
appointment of transport ministers and the establishment of parliamentary or assembly 
committees. Relational filling in, by contrast, is concerned with how devolution is interpreted 
and shaped by staff personnel within the different devolved jurisdictions, involving the 
introduction of new responsibilities, the identification and narration of new strategic priorities 
and the evolution of new organisational relations. Here, a clear contrast emerged between 
London and Northern Ireland, on the one hand, and Scotland and Wales, on the other, in 
21 
 
 
terms of the effectiveness of political leaders in generating momentum (Leach and Wilson, 
2004; Sweeting, 2002). The importance of key personnel in interpreting and shaping transport 
devolution underlines the significance of Jessop’s point that the state has no power as such, 
only the power of the social forces acting in and through it (Jessop, 1990).  
 
We have also drawn upon Brenner’s ‘new state spaces’ framework to examine how new 
organisational structures, institutional practices and power relations have emerged out of the 
interaction between the pre-existing fabric of the UK state and the emergent ‘state spatial 
project’ of devolution. As this implies, devolution was not simply created from above by 
central government in a new and ‘pure’ form, with the possible exception of London, but 
grafted onto “long-established institutions and practices of territorial administration” (Jeffery, 
2007: 93). In essence, Brenner’s approach is scale-neutral, and we have adapted it to refer to 
the establishment and activation of the devolved structures themselves and the evolution of 
relations between the devolved administrations and central government (cf. Brenner, 2004). 
Thus, the expansion and reorganisation of transport departments and the establishment of 
parliamentary or assembly committees can be viewed as products of the interaction between 
devolution and inherited institutional arrangements. At the same time, the development of 
‘vertical’ relationships between the devolved administrations and the central government 
relied heavily on informal interactions and linkages between officials and ministers, rather 
than more formal institutional mechanisms (see Trench, 2004). As such, the development of 
inter-governmental relations was characterised by relational rather than structural forms of 
filling in. While the development of these largely informal relations was couched in terms of 
the need for the state to adapt to devolution, much of this actually seemed to involve adapting 
devolution to the state so as to maintain institutional and political stability, reflecting the 
continuing norms and practices of civil service incrementalism (Mitchell, 2004). While 
devolution provides a wider range of social and political forces with access to the resources 
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and powers of the state, our research highlights the role of state personnel in managing and 
controlling institutional relations, resulting in a strong degree of path dependence outside of 
London (Pierson, 1993).  
 
Finally, in view of our emphasis on devolution as an unfolding process with emerging and 
unpredictable implications and repercussions (Keating, 2009), it is worth considering the 
evolution of UK devolution over the past couple of years, acknowledging that our main focus 
in this paper has been the 1999-2007 period. This period was marked by considerable stability 
in inter-government relations, underpinned by substantial increases in public expenditure and 
common Labour Party government at the devolved and UK scales (Trench, 2004). This has 
changed markedly since 2007 with the emergence of what might be termed a new politics of 
devolution defined by the entry of nationalist parties into government in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, pressures for greater autonomy and cuts in public expenditure. In common 
with other devolved states, the direction of movement in the UK is towards greater 
decentralisation with demand from Scotland for – at the least – ‘devolution-plus’ whilst the 
Welsh government is committed to holding a referendum on granting full legislative powers 
to the devolved assembly. In this respect, the UK may be moving towards a looser form of 
union (Keating, 2009), and on-going reductions in public expenditure are likely to become the 
focus of tensions between the devolved territories and the central state, placing great pressure 
on the networks of practice developed by state personnel between 1999 and 2007.  
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Notes 
1 Technically, the creation of these institutions was a product of local government reform in England 
although the process has resulted in de facto devolution.  
2 Brenner also refers to ‘state spatial projects’ which refer to how the state interacts with society more 
broadly to promote economic and social development.   
3 The Calman Commission on Scottish Devolution recommended in 2009 the transfer of authority for  
speed limit and drink driving legislation to the Scottish Parliament. 
4 Livingstone was a former Leader of the Greater London Council, had long been a thorn in the side of 
central governments (especially of Conservative administrations but he was also seen by Tony Blair’s 
‘new’ Labour establishment as sufficiently iconoclastic to be barred from standing as its official 
candidate in the mayoral elections of 2000) and was regarded as something of a ‘champion of London’ 
by many of the capital’s residents. 
5 This is a reference to Sir Humphrey Appleby, the fictitious and self-interested Permanent Secretary in 
the Department of Administrative Affairs in the BBC sitcom Yes, Minister.   
6 This is the operating name of the Northern Ireland Transport Holding Company, the main public 
transport company in the province.  
7 The clearest example of this being breached is in relation to the Scottish Executive’s decision to fund 
free personal care for the elderly in 2001, which resulted in UK government policy advisors in London 
‘screaming down the phone’ to their Scottish Executive counterparts in Edinburgh (Laffin and Shaw, 
2007).  
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Table 1. Devolved and reserved functions in transport. Source: adapted from Smyth, 2003. 
 
 
 Scotland Wales  Northern Ireland London 
Road  Total Limited Total Total 
Rail Substantial  Limited Total Limited 
Bus Total Limited Total Total 
Air Limited None None N/A 
Sea (ferry) Substantial None None N/A 
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Table 2. Changing transport structures and ministers in the Scottish Executive. Adapted and 
extended from Allmendinger, 2002. 
Date  Minister Party Portfolio  Department 
 
May 1999 Sarah Boyack Labour Transport and the 
Environment 
(including 
planning) 
Transport and 
the 
Environment 
(including 
planning) 
November 2000 Sarah Boyack Labour Transport Transport and 
the 
Environment 
(including 
planning) 
May 2001 Sarah Boyack Labour Transport and 
Planning  
Transport and 
the 
Environment 
November 2001 Wendy 
Alexander 
Labour Enterprise, 
Transport and 
Lifelong Learning 
Development  
May 2002 Iain Gray  Labour Enterprise, 
Transport and 
Lifelong Learning 
Development  
May 2003 Nicol Stephen Liberal 
Democrat 
Transport Enterprise, 
Transport and 
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Lifelong 
Learning 
June 2005 Tavish Scott Liberal 
Democrat 
Transport Enterprise, 
Transport and 
Lifelong 
Learning 
May 2007 Stewart 
Stevenson 
SNP Transport, 
Infrastructure and 
Climate Change 
Finance and 
Sustainable 
Growth  
 
 
Table 3 Changing transport structures and ministers in the Welsh Assembly Government.  
 
Date  Minister Party Portfolio  Department 
May 1999 Peter Law Labour  Environment 
and Local 
Government 
Environment 
and Local 
Government 
February 2000 Sue Essex Labour Environment, 
Planning and 
Transport 
Environment, 
Planning and 
Transport 
May 2003 Andrew Davies Labour Economic 
Development 
and Transport 
Economic 
Development 
and Transport 
April 2006 Andrew Davies Labour Enterprise, 
Innovation and 
Enterprise, 
Innovation and 
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Networks Networks 
May 2007 Ieuan Wyn 
Jones  
Plaid Cymru Economy and 
Transport 
Economy and 
Transport 
 
 
 
Table 4 Transport Ministers in Northern Ireland since 1999 
 
Date  Minister Party Portfolio  
November 1999 Peter Robinson DUP Regional Development 
July 2000 
 
Gregory Campbell 
 
DUP 
 
Regional Development 
October 2001 Peter Robinson DUP Regional Development 
October 2002 Angela Smith Labour Regional Development 
June 2003 John Spellar Labour Regional Development 
May 2005 Shaun Woodward Labour Regional Development 
June  2006 David Cairns Labour Regional Development 
March 2007 Conor Murphy Sinn Fein Regional Development 
 
